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Georgia State University E-Reserves and HathiTrust Cases  
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ABSTRACT 
Academic libraries rely on fair use for key functions in support of education. Among these 
functions are electronic reserves, mass digitization, providing access for print-disabled students, 
and preservation. These were the practices at issue in the 2008 Georgia State University e-
reserves case and the 2012 HathiTrust case. This article explores the two lawsuits where libraries 
were sued for alleged copyright infringement. We explore how the courts in each case applied 
fair use to the facts of the case, compare and contrast the courts’ analysis, and explain the role 
that transformative use plays in distinguishing the outcomes. Finally, the article applies lessons 
learned from the two cases to common library activities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of fair use as a legal doctrine is part of the story of the United States as a new 
nation. In 1839, Jared Sparks published a twelve-volume biography of George Washington 
including Washington’s letters and correspondences, not previously published. There was a 
presumption of significant public interest in a first published work on the life of the relatively 
new nation’s first president. Sparks’ copyright interest in Washington’s biography had eight 
more years of protection under the 1790 Copyright Act. But in October 1841, Sparks’ printer and 
publisher Charles Folsom sued Massachusetts bookseller Bela Marsh for copyright infringement 
for publishing a two-volume biography of George Washington that took pages of Washington’s 
letters and correspondences from the Sparks book. Although Marsh was found to be infringing, 
in considering the case, Judge Story formulated the basis of fair use: “the question of piracy, 
often depends upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the 
other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; and the 
degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common 
sources of information, or to have exercised the same common diligence in the selection and 
arrangement of the materials.  Thus, for example, no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly 
cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the 
purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (1841).  
 
U.S. courts have been deciding fair use cases for close to two hundred years of American 
legal history. Between 1841 to 1976, U.S. courts decided whether specific uses of works under 
copyright protection were fair, relying on Story’s fair use statement. Congress finally codified 
fair use as Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The scope of uses implicating the fair use 
doctrine over the centuries is broad and varied. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
whether time-shifting or recording a television show for later viewing was fair use (Sony Corp. 
of America v. Universal, 1984). In 1994, it considered whether a rap song by 2 Live Crew 
sufficiently transformed Roy Orbison’s 1964 song “Oh, Pretty Woman,” into a new work to be 
fair use (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.). And in 2007, a 9th Circuit California court 
considered whether Google’s transmission of Perfect 10’s images of nude models constituted fair 
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use (Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com). The courts in each of these instances concluded fair use 
prevailed. 
 
Since 1841, there are only two substantial legal cases involving libraries as parties named 
in major litigation making it to U.S. courts’ dockets. This paper explores the contours of the fair 
use defenses in Cambridge UP, et al. v. Becker, et al., popularly known as the Georgia State 
University eReserves case (GSU), and Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, (HDL).  
 
 Electronic reserves and mass digitization are two of many functions that academic 
libraries perform as a matter of course in serving their educational missions. The fact that these 
activities end up in the court system is noteworthy on several fronts. It indicates that libraries 
employ the kinds of technologies that require courts to define the scope of what is legal under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, passed well before current technologies existed. Additionally, it 
challenges librarians to become savvier in their knowledge of copyright, and other bodies of law, 
including contract, that inform how we do our work. 
 
By providing a foundational overview of copyright law and fair use, this paper aims to 
inform librarians of and contextualize core activities as electronic reserves and mass digitization, 
within the American legal tradition. To what end? Numerous library activities implicate fair use, 
not just as a defense to a potential copyright infringement suit, but as a right articulated in the 
Copyright Act itself. By comparing and contrasting how the courts analyze the four factors in the 
two cases, we can gain a fuller understanding of how courts decide what constitutes fair use, and 
are thus better able to anticipate how courts may respond to a potential copyright infringement 
litigation.  
          
PUTTING FAIR USE IN CONTEXT 
Copyright ownership confers the legal right to exclude others from “reproducing, 
distributing, creating derivative works, displaying the work publicly, performing the work 
publicly, or performing the work by digital audio transmission” (17 U.S.C. § 106) without 
permission or license from the owner. But suppose a teacher needs to show portions of or an 
entire film in the classroom or upload it to a secure online platform for students to view it for an 
assignment1. A print-disabled student might need a whole book digitized for a course.2 At the 
end of a semester, a student plans to resell used textbooks to a bookstore.3 Libraries buy books so 
they can lend them and often send journal articles to other libraries.4 These scenarios implicate 
exclusive rights of copyright owners. In each of these instances, would the user then have to ask 
permission of the copyright owner each time he or she needs to perform everyday activities that 
are essential to scholarship and teaching? What if the owner refuses permission, would that 
foreclose the public from using copyrighted works? 
 
Approved in 1787, the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution aimed to balance the 
rights of authors and inventors with public needs to use protected works. “Congress shall have 
Power… To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to 
Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.). Sections 107-122 of the Copyright Act set exceptions to owner’s 
exclusive rights that allow public use of copyrighted works without requiring the owner’s 
permission to do so.   
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The 1976 Copyright Act laid out the fair use exception to the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders in section 107 of the act: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 
Added to the legislative record of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Agreement on Guidelines 
for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and 
Periodicals (“Classroom Copying Guidelines”) was not part of the Act itself. Partisan groups 
developed the guidelines (Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1235 f.12 (11th Cir. 
Ga. Oct. 17, 2014) which not only blatantly diverge from the four factors in the fair-use statute 
and replace them with three different mandates, but also add blanket prohibitions that cannot be 
overcome by any balancing of factors or equities (Crews 2001, 618). However, in litigation 
publishers cite the Classroom Copying Guidelines as if the Guidelines have legal authority. 
(Crews 2001, 639-656).  Accordingly, the guidelines are not law.  
 
THE COPY SHOP CASES AS PRECEDENT FOR GSU AND HATHITRUST  
While lawsuits against academic libraries for copyright infringement is novel before the 
GSU and HathiTrust cases, there is precedent for courts to consider. The GSU case follows a line 
of cases tracing back to Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 
November 27, 1973) where the National Institute of Health’s photocopying of articles for 
researchers was found to be fair use. The copy shop and Texaco cases followed. Most analogous 
to the GSU case were the copy shop cases, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991), and Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 
F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. Mich. Nov. 8, 1996). 
 
In each case, the issue was whether a copy shop creating coursepacks from copyrighted 
material, without paying license fees, was infringing on copyrights held by the publishers. In 
both cases, the commercial nature of the use weighed against fair use. The courts focused on the 
purpose of the copy shop in selling the coursepacks, not the educational purpose of the 
professors or students. The court in Princeton explicitly declined to consider whether it would be 
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fair use for students or professors to make their own copies. (Princeton 1389). Both courts also 
deem the purpose of the use non-transformative, so weighing against fair use. 
 
Addressing the Defendant’s argument that academic authors do not need economic 
incentive to publish, the Princeton court concluded that it is publishers who own the copyrights 
and obviously need economic incentives to publish scholarly works, even if the scholars do not 
need direct economic incentives to write such works. (Princeton 1390). The Princeton court 
further rejected Defendant’s argument that only book sales should be considered. It reasoned that 
when a copyright holder has an interest in exploiting the licensing market, especially when they 
have already done so, potential licensing revenues should be considered in a fair use analysis 
(id.). Both courts found the fourth factor weighs against fair use. 
 
Decided between the two copy shop cases, the issue in Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, (2d Cir. N.Y. Oct. 28, 1994) was whether Texaco infringed the publisher’s 
copyrights when it allowed researchers to make copies of journal articles. Physical copies of 
journals were circulated to the researchers, who made copies of articles for later use. (Am. 
Geophysical 926). The court did not consider the research purpose of the scientists as opposed to 
the sales purpose in Kinko’s, finding that the purpose of the copies was to avoid paying for 
additional copies, and the researcher’s use of the articles was ultimately to the benefit of Texaco, 
and therefore commercial. (Am. Geophysical 922). 
 
In considering the fourth factor, the court noted there was an existing workable market 
for institutional users to obtain licenses through the Copyright Clearance Center. (Am. 
Geophysical 930). Rejecting the notion that a license market destroys the possibility of fair use, 
the court found this danger only arises if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair 
use. (Am. Geophysical 931) The court nonetheless found that the fourth factor also weighed in 
favor of the Plaintiffs, and ultimately found Texaco liable for copyright infringement. 
 
These three cases raise issues that will be prominent in the Georgia State case, including 
the status and authority of the Classroom Copying Guidelines. In each case, the court found the 
purpose of the use non-transformative and commercial, so weighing against fair use, and did not 
address library or noncommercial copying. The courts also examined the place of licensing 
revenue in the fourth factor consideration of market impact. 
 
In contrast, the HathiTrust case followed a line of transformative use cases where the 
nature of the use is different from the creator’s intended use. The U.S. Supreme Court case 
Campbell v. Acuff Rose first defined transformative fair use, asking whether a use supersedes the 
original use, “or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and 
to what extent the new work is “transformative”.” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 579). The legal question in the HathiTrust case turned on the first factor analysis of whether 
HDL’s full-text search engine was transformative and thus a fair use.  
  
CAMBRIDGE UP, ET AL. V. BECKER, ET AL. (GSU CASE) 
In April 2008 Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Sage 
Publications, Inc. sued Georgia State University for copyright infringement for making works 
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available on its electronic reserve system without paying permissions or licensing fees. Among 
other defenses, GSU, a unit of the University System of Georgia (USG), claimed the affirmative 
defense of fair use. In 2009, USG implemented a new fair use policy and checklist. This 
checklist provided instructors with a method of determining whether their use of a particular 
work in electronic reserves or a course management system was a fair use. It was similar to 
checklists used by many universities, in particular that created at Columbia University. 
(https://copyright.columbia.edu/basics/fair-use/fair-use-checklist.html). Following many 
competing motions, the court determined that the trial would proceed based on works published 
by the three Defendants and used during the spring, summer, and fall semesters of 2009, the 
semesters immediately following the implementation of the new checklist. 
 
A non-jury bench trial was held in 2011, and in 2012 the North Georgia District Court 
issued the first opinion. The court found five instances of infringement among 76 alleged 
instances and declared GSU the prevailing party. The Publishers appealed, and in 2014 the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court decision and sent the case back 
to the District Court to reconsider. A minority opinion strongly disagreed with the majority’s fair 
use analysis.5 The District Court issued a new ruling in 2016, finding only four instances of 
infringement. The publishers again appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. As of this writing, a new 
ruling from the Eleventh Circuit is pending.  
 
In this paper, the GSU cases are referenced as follows.6 The first District Court case, 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (2012) will be Cambridge 2012. The 
Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court decision, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 
(2014) will be Cambridge 2014, and the second District Court decision, Cambridge Univ. Press 
v. Becker, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118793 (2016) will be Cambridge 2016. Since much of the 2012 
decision was affirmed by the 2014 decision, sections of both opinions are cited. 
 
AUTHORS GUILD V. HATHITRUST 
In 2004, a group of research universities permitted Google to digitize books in their 
collections, known as the Google Books Project. In 2008, led by the University of Michigan 
Libraries, thirteen research libraries announced their launch of the HathiTrust Digital Library 
(HDL), a collection of over ten million digitized works, including works digitized by Google, 
from 80 member libraries. The scope of the digital collection is vast. It comprises books from 
different languages, published in different time periods, and in different genres and topics. In the 
HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL) project, the digitization of in-copyright books involves three 
distinct uses. First, HDL allows users from the general public to search for terms within a 
specified work, and the output displays the page numbers where the word is found within the 
work and the number of times the word is on each page. The search results do not include any 
text from the works searched. Second, HDL allows users with certified print disabilities to access 
the full-text of digitized works. Print disability is evaluated and certified by qualified experts and 
includes conditions such as a visual impairment, learning disability, physical disability, or other 
disability – that impedes a person’s ability to access print in the standard way. Third, HDL 
digitized in-copyright books for preservation purposes. A member university library or archive, 
or one open to the public can make a replacement copy of a book if the library already owns a 
copy, and the library’s copy is lost, destroyed, or stolen, and the replacement copy is not 
6 
available at a fair market price. HDL stores copies of the in-copyright books at four different 
campuses as backup. 
 
The University of Michigan also worked on a digitization plan for orphan works under 
the Orphan Works Project (OWP). Orphan works are out of print books that are still under 
copyright protection whose copyright holder is not known or readily found to ask permission to 
make certain uses of the work. The University of Michigan, however, suspended the OWP roll 
out due to concern that it's filtering between orphan works and in-copyright books may not be 
adequately stringent to rule out in-copyright books from the digitization process. 
 
In 2012, the Authors Guild brought suit against university officials associated with the 
HDL, alleging the Defendants infringed the copyright of the Plaintiffs’ works by digitizing, 
distributing, and storing books in the Defendants’ collections without obtaining permission or 
having a license from the copyright owners to do so. On behalf of individuals who have print 
disabilities, the National Federation for the Blind intervened in the lawsuit. HDL moved for 
summary judgment, asking the court not to send the case to a jury trial because there was no 
dispute over the facts. The court granted summary judgment to HDL, and subsequently, 
Plaintiffs appealed the decision. 
 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the Southern District of New York considered 
the decisions of the District Court. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that 
it was fair use for HDL to digitize in-copyright works for full-text searching, allowing access to 
digitized full-text content to certified print-disabled users.  
 
In this paper, the HathiTrust cases are referenced as follows. The District Court Decision, 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (2012) will be Authors Guild 2012. The 
Second Circuit Appellate Court decision, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2014) 
will be Authors Guild 2014. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS 
Both the Georgia State and HathiTrust lawsuits involve academic libraries. They both 
revolve around digitization of print books. The GSU case is about mirror-image copying, while 
HathiTrust is a transformative use. This section explores how the courts do or do not vary in their 
application of the four fair use factors. 
 
In the GSU case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated the intended purpose of 
copyright, “which is to promote the creation of new works for the public good by providing 
authors and other creators with an economic incentive to create” Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Further, “some unpaid use of copyrighted materials must be 
allowed in order to prevent copyright from functioning as a straightjacket that stifles to the very 
creative activity it seeks to foster,” and that fair use helps a court find the appropriate balance. 
(Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1238 (2014)). 
 
Factor 1 - The Purpose and Character of the Use, Including Whether Such Use Is of a 
Commercial Nature or Is for Nonprofit Educational Purposes 
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In analyzing the first factor, the courts ask whether the use “transforms” the material 
taken from the copyrighted work by using it for a broadly beneficial purpose different from that 
of the original, or if the use of the work is for the same intent and value as the original. 
Transformative uses are considered to be more fair. In contrast, “mirror image” copying where 
the use of the material is the same as the author’s intent is considered less fair. Also considered 
under the first factor is whether the use is for a commercial or nonprofit purpose and whether the 
use is educational. These factors derive from the preface to the fair use statute, which calls out 
examples of the types of purposes that may be fair use “such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 
U.S.C. § 107. 
 
In considering the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the GSU courts 
diverged from the findings of the copy shop and Texaco courts. While those courts put great 
weight on the commercial nature of the use, the GSU courts put equal emphasis on the non-profit 
educational use. “Because Georgia State is a purely nonprofit, educational institution and the 
excerpts at issue were used for purely nonprofit, educational purposes, this case is 
distinguishable from Kinko’s, Michigan Document Services, and Texaco.” (Cambridge Univ. 
Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1224 (2012). The court also found that even though 
transformative uses are more likely to be fair uses, that was not a bar to finding that factor one 
favored fair use, noting that the Supreme Court stated that “the obvious statutory exception to 
this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom 
distribution.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 579 at n.11 (1994). The court 
found that since the uses are included in the preamble to factor one and GSU is a nonprofit 
educational institution; factor one favored fair use for all excerpts. (Cambridge 2014, 1267). The 
minority opinion argued that the analysis should focus primarily on the use, not on the user, and 
found GSU’s use the same as the use in the Coursepack Cases and that rather than the focus 
being on the distinction between commercial and non-profit (or educational and non-
educational), the focus should only be on the distinction between transformative use and non-
transformative use that supersedes the original work. (Cambridge 2014, 1289).   
 
Analyzing the first factor, the HathiTrust court looked at each of three uses -- full-text 
searching, preservation, and access for the print-disabled. The court found the full-text search 
transformative, finding that “there is no evidence that the Authors write with the purpose of 
enabling text searches of their books. Consequently, the full-text search function does not 
"supersede[] the objects [or purposes] of the original creation. (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 
755 F.3d 87, 97 (2014). The District Court found that access for the print-disabled was not 
transformative but, citing the legislative history of the Copyright Act, found that it was a favored 
use under the first factor. “The House Committee Report that accompanied codification of the 
fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly stated that making copies accessible "for 
the use of blind persons" posed a "special instance illustrating the application of the fair use 
doctrine . . ." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73 (1976).” (Authors Guild 2014, 102). Finally, 
although not affirmed by the Circuit Court, the District Court also found preservation to weigh in 
favor of fair use under the first factor, due to its non-commercial purpose.  (Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 459 (2012)). 
 
Factor 2 - The Nature of the Copyrighted Work  
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Under the second factor, courts determine whether the work being used is creative or 
fact-based. The District Court in the GSU case found that since the books were all factual in 
nature, the second factor always favored fair use. The Eleventh Circuit appellate court found the 
all-encompassing approach to be erroneous, holding that where the excerpts contained 
“evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts 
necessary to communicate information, or derives from the Authors experiences or opinions” 
(Cambridge 2014, 1270) the District Court should have found the second factor neutral or 
weighing against fair use. But the court added that the second factor is of relatively little 
importance in this case. (id.). On remand, the District Court considered whether the excerpts go 
beyond mere facts, and found a mix of outcomes with the second factor neutral or weighing 
against fair use, but the factor does not impact the overall analysis of each excerpt.  The 
HathiTrust court did not give much weight to the second factor, noting that “this factor may be of 
limited use usefulness where, as here, the creative work is being used for a transformative 
purpose.” (Authors Guild 2014, 98, citing Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 
F.3d 605, 612 (2006)). 
 
Factor 3 - The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used In Relation to the Copyrighted 
Work  
 The GSU District Court first said that determining the permissible amount requires 
looking at factors one and four, observed the danger that mirror-image copies can lead to market 
substitution, and noted that the threat is reduced when the amount used is small. The court 
rejected any role for the Classroom Copying Guidelines in determining the appropriate amount 
for fair use and went on to note that while the works at issue are similar to those in the copy shop 
cases, the nonprofit educational use allows for a greater amount than the commercial uses. 
(Cambridge 2012, 1232). The District Court created a metric whereby as long as the excerpt fills 
a legitimate educational purpose and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose, if a book is 
not divided into chapters or is fewer than ten chapters, copying of no more than 10% weighs in 
favor of fair use, and when a book has ten or more chapters, copying of one chapter weighs in 
favor. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the District Court’s ten percent/one-
chapter rule was improper, and approved of the District Court’s consideration of whether 
individual instances were excessive in relation to the pedagogical purpose. (Cambridge 2014, 
1275). The minority opinion argued that the Classroom Guidelines should be given weight since 
they “provide, inter alia, strict word count limits on allowable copying, such as the lesser of an 
excerpt from a prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 10 percent of the work.” (Cambridge 
2014, 1290). This is a surprising argument since the Classroom Guidelines themselves begin 
“[t]he purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum and not the maximum 
standards of educational fair use under Section 107.” (emphasis added). (Classroom Guidelines). 
 
The HathiTrust court agreed that there is no bright-line rule as to how much can be 
copied (Authors Guild 2014, 98) and still remain a fair use, and that “for some purposes it may 
be necessary to copy the whole work, in which case Factor Three does not weigh against a 
finding of fair use” (id.). Considering the HDL purposes, the court found that it was reasonably 
necessary to copy the entire works, so the copying was not excessive (id.).  
 
Factor 4 - The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted 
Work  
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The GSU court reasoned that the adverse market effect to consider is that of market 
substitution, always a threat of mirror image copying, and concluded that decidedly small 
excerpts do not substitute for the book as a whole so do not threaten the actual or potential sales 
of books, even if the practice is widespread. (Cambridge 2012, 1236). The court proceeded to 
focus not on the book market, but the market for licensed excerpts, stating that “a book’s ability 
to command permission fees has a relationship to the value of the copyrighted, book, i.e., to the 
value of the copyright.” (id., 1237).  Citing Texaco, the court stated, “where excerpts are 
reasonably available, at a reasonable price, it is only fair for this fact to be considered in 
determining whether Defendants’ unpaid uses of excerpts constitutes a fair use” (id.). The court 
found that where no license was available, the use caused no actual or potential damage to the 
value of the copyrights (id., 1238), but the fourth factor weighs heavily against fair use when a 
license is readily available. The Eleventh Circuit supported this finding, noting that a copyright 
holder can always find an impact on potential licensing revenues, but “the goal of copyright is to 
stimulate the creation of new works, not to furnish copyright holders with control over all 
markets. Accordingly, the ability to license does not demand a finding against fair use.” 
(Cambridge 2014, 1276). However, a use can be “more fair” when there is not a license and “less 
fair” when a license or means of payment exists. The minority opinion argued that the majority 
was in error in considering the availability of the license since “establishing market harm does 
not require a showing of lost profits, nor is it dependent on the availability of a digital license. 
Rather, what counts is whether some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.” (Cambridge 
2014, 1291 quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451).  
 
The HathiTrust court initially noted that “[f]actor four analysis is concerned with only 
one type of economic injury to a copyright holder: the harm that results because the secondary 
use serves as a substitute for the original work” (Authors Guild 2014, 99). The court dismissed 
the Plaintiff’s argument that every digitized book represents a lost sale, noting that purchase of 
an additional copy would not allow for full-text searching or access for the print-disabled. 
(Authors Guild 2012, 462), and found Plaintiff’s argument about the potential for widespread 
piracy unsupported. The court found that the fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use for full-text 
searching, since “a use that falls within a transformative market does not cause the copyright 
holder to suffer market harm due to the loss of license fees”(id. at 463), and weighs in favor for 
access to the print-disabled since this access does not significantly impact a market (id. at 464). 
The court further noted that development of a license market for full-text searching or 
development of a market for print-disabled access is speculative at best and the harm identified 
minimal. (id., 464 fn. 30).  
 
Balancing the factors in the GSU case, the Eleventh Circuit began by approving of the 
case-by-case analysis done by the District Court, stating that otherwise “courts would have no 
principled method of determining whether a nebulous cloud of alleged infringements purportedly 
caused by a secondary user should be excused by the defense of fair use” (Cambridge 2014, 
1258 fn. 20). It further stated that the factors are not to be treated in isolation but weighed 
together in light of the purposes of copyright. (See Campbell). 
 
In balancing the factors, the HathiTrust District Court held that “[t]he enhanced search 
capabilities that reveal no in-copyright material, the protection of Defendants' fragile books, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the unprecedented ability of print-disabled individuals to have an 
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equal opportunity to compete with their sighted peers in the ways imagined by the ADA 
protect the copies made by Defendants as fair use.” (Authors Guild 2012, 464). 
 
DISCUSSION 
HathiTrust moved for summary judgment, arguing that the libraries' uses of the works are 
protected fair uses. The court granted this motion (while denying a contrary motion from the 
Authors Guild), finding that the full-text and print-disabled uses were fair uses as a matter of 
law, so the case did not go to trial and there was no work-by-work analysis. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment. In contrast, the GSU case did not stop at the 
summary judgment stage and proceeded to trial. Therefore, there is a much more in-depth fair 
use analysis for the works at issue in the GSU case. 
 
Under the first factor, the N.D. Ga. District Court and the S.D.N.Y District Court both 
considered the nature and purpose of the use. This is a two-part factor. The nature of the use in 
the cases is similar - digitization of print copies of copyrighted works. The difference is the 
purpose of the use, which is where the question of whether the use was mirror-image copying or 
transformative is relevant.  
 
In the GSU case, the court found the purpose to be the same purpose for which the book 
was published - for reading in a university setting. In contrast, the court in HathiTrust found that 
creating a full-text search capability was different from the purpose for which the works were 
published. The full-text search does not expose a text for reading, which is the original purpose. 
The court also found that access for the print-disabled was different from the original - since the 
works were not available in an accessible format, the court found that original purpose was for 
reading by sighted persons (Authors Guild 2012, 461).  
 
Since the purposes in the HathiTrust case are transformative, the first factor weighed in 
favor, and the impact of the fourth factor, the market effect, is attenuated since it is not 
competing with the intended market.7 The mirror-image copying in the GSU case weighs in 
favor under this factor because it is non-commercial, educational use, even though it is not 
transformative. Therefore the fourth factor has more weight since there is a threat of market 
substitution. When courts find a use transformative under the first factor, the alleged 
infringement is far more likely to be found fair use than when a use is not transformative. A 2011 
study of fair use case history concluded that “[i]f the use is transformative and the Defendant has 
not copied excessively in light of the transformative purpose, the use will most likely be held to 
be a fair use. This is so even if the copyright holder might enter or already has entered a licensing 
market for similar uses, and indeed even if the copyright holder would have been willing in 
principle to license the use in question.” (Netanel 2011), 768). 
 
Both courts concluded that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, has 
little weight in the analysis, but reach that conclusion via different paths. The HathiTrust court 
followed the precedent of other transformative use cases, finding that “where a use is 
transformative, the nature of the copyrighted works is not likely to “separate the fair use sheep 
from the infringing goats.” (Authors Guild 2012, 461, citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). The 
court concluded that because the use is transformative, the second factor is not very relevant to 
their analysis. (id.). The GSU court cited Harper & Row, “the law generally recognizes a greater 
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need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy, and so it is more likely that 
the use of a factual or informational work will be fair use” (Cambridge 2014, 1268 citing Harper 
& Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985), but then went on to examine other 
precedent where the work was both factual and creative, ultimately finding that the District Court 
was in error when it held that since none of the works are fictional, the second factor always 
favored fair use. The Eleventh Circuit calls for a more nuanced analysis, stating that “where the 
excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works contained evaluative, analytical, or subjectively described material 
that surpasses the bare facts necessary to communicate information, or derives from the Authors 
own experiences or opinions” (Cambridge 2014, 1270) the second factor is neutral or against 
where such material dominated the work. However, the court concluded “[t]that being said, the 
second fair use factor is of relatively little importance in this case” (id.) since the works are 
neither fictional nor unpublished. For the second factor, the outcome of the two cases is similar 
even though transformative use means the paths are different. 
 
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole, demonstrates the importance of the first factor in third factor 
analysis. The HathiTrust court began its discussion “[t]he third fair-use factor considers whether 
the amount of copying was reasonable in relation to the purpose.” (Authors Guild 2012, 461, 
citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) at 449-50). The 
court readily concluded that entire copies of the works were necessary for both full-text 
searching and access for the print-disabled. (Authors Guild 2012, 461). By finding the purpose 
under factor one transformative, the factor-three analysis became straightforward. In GSU, the 
nonprofit, educational use resulted in factor one always weighing in favor. However, the purpose 
does not as easily define the fair amount used in the mirror-image copying context, since the 
court must consider the effect on the market under the fourth factor. Still, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the proper approach was to ask whether the amount used is excessive in light of the 
pedagogical purpose. (Cambridge 2014, 1275). 
 
The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work is the 
fourth factor and is the factor where the divide between transformative and non-transformative 
fair use cases is most evident. In HathiTrust, the transformative nature and purpose of the use 
meant there was no market impact. “Courts consider only those markets that the creators of 
original works would in general develop or license others to develop.” (Authors Guild 2012, 462, 
quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 at 592.) The Plaintiffs in HathiTrust argued harm to a 
potential licensing market that would allow for the HathiTrust activities. The court rejected this 
argument since it is always possible to argue a potential market, stating, “courts should consider 
only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.” (Authors Guild 2012, 463, 
quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 614), and concluded that “a use that falls within a transformative 
market does not cause the copyright holder to suffer market harm due to the loss of market fees.” 
(Authors Guild 2012, 463 citing Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 615). 
 
The courts consideration in the GSU case started with a different approach, stating that 
the court must consider “(1) the extent of the market harm caused by the particular actions of the 
alleged infringer, and (2) whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by 
the Defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market”(Cambridge 
2014, 1276, citing Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 
12 
1287, 1315), going on to state since the use is nontransformative, and the works are published for 
educational purposes, the threat of market substitution is large. The court recognized the danger 
of allowing a market impact always to militate against a finding of fair use but states that as long 
as the availability of license doesn’t demand a finding against fair use, the market impact should 
carry significant weight. While in HathiTrust the court refused to consider a potential licensing 
market, in GSU the actual licensing market is determinative for the fourth factor analysis. Where 
a license is available the use is ‘less fair’ than when there is not a license available. (Cambridge 
2014, 1276). Transformative uses are not contemplated by the original use, whereas 
nontransformative uses are by definition using the work in the way it was originally 
contemplated, so a license market is likely to be a “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed market.” (citing Texaco, 60 F3d at 614). 
 
The courts evaluated each fair use factor in a similar way. The finding of transformative 
or mirror-image under the first factor drove the rest of the analysis. Each court considered 
precedent from cases with transformative or mirror image findings under the first factor. The 
transformative use found in HDL led the court to grant summary judgment. The rest of the 
factors are far less important once the court labels the use transformative. The nontransformative 
use holding in GSU meant that every use had to be analyzed with all four factors, even though 
factor one was always weighing in favor. The pedagogical purpose, the amount used, and the 
effect on the market must all be considered to determine if a use is fair. 
 
LESSONS FOR FAIR USE IN LIBRARY SERVICES 
In 2012, based on dozens of interviews with academic librarians and a series of small 
group discussions held with library policymakers around the country, a research team developed 
a consensus approach to applying fair use, and ARL released the Code of Best Practices in Fair 
Use (Code) (Association of Research Libraries 2012). The Code discusses seven library 
activities that rely on fair use: Supporting teaching and learning with access to library materials 
via digital technologies; using selections from collection materials to publicize a library’s 
activities, or to create physical and virtual exhibitions; digitizing to preserve at-risk items; 
creating digital collections of archival and special collections materials; reproducing material for 
use by disabled students, faculty, staff, and other appropriate users; maintaining the integrity of 
works deposited in institutional repositories; and creating databases to facilitate non consumptive 
research uses (including search). Four of the activities are explicitly found to be fair use in the 
two cases. 
 
Supporting teaching and learning with access to library materials via digital technologies 
describes the sharing of materials in e-reserves and course management systems, the practice at 
issue in the GSU case. While the Code argues that many of these uses can be transformative, it 
also recognizes what was key to fair use findings in GSU - “materials should be made available 
only when, and only to the extent that, there is a clear, articulable nexus between the instructor’s 
pedagogical purpose and the kind and amount of content involved.” (Code 14).  While the GSU 
court did not find any of the uses to be transformative, the Eleventh Circuit court did not rule out 
a use ever being transformative, stating that “[w]e need not rule on whether such uses could ever 
be transformative, because the question is not before us.” (Cambridge 2014, 1263 fn. 21; see also 
Butler 2015). When relying on fair use for e-reserves, libraries should ensure that the use is 
13 
either clearly transformative or is only of an amount that is carefully tailored to the pedagogical 
need and considers the impact on the market.  
 
Digitizing to preserve at-risk items is one of the three activities the court considers in 
HathiTrust. While section 108 of the copyright act provides some ability to libraries to digitize 
works, the current language requires the works be “damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if 
the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete,” (17 U.S.C. § 108(c)) 
limiting the ability to save works. The S.D.N.Y. HathiTrust court found that while preservation 
on its own was not transformative, the preservation purposes of the HDL are noncommercial in 
nature (Authors Guild 2012, 458 fn. 19). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not affirm this 
as fair use but sent it back to the lower court for Plaintiffs to show actual damage. As the 
Plaintiffs did not pursue the case after the Second Circuit decision, the question of relying on fair 
use for digitizing to preserve at-risk items is still undecided in the courts. 
 
Reproducing material for use by disabled students, faculty, staff, and other appropriate 
users is a use identified in the Code that was strongly affirmed in HathiTrust, where the court 
concluded that providing access to the print-disabled is a valid purpose under the first factor even 
though it is not transformative. (Authors Guild 2014, 102). The court recognized that the activity 
is also covered under section 121 of the Copyright Act (The Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. 
§121), but after doing a full fair use analysis determined it is also fair use. Libraries should feel 
confident providing access to in-copyright works to print-disabled patrons. 
 
Finally, creating databases to facilitate nonconsumptive research uses (including search) 
was analyzed in HathiTrust. The court found this activity to be transformative, noting that “the 
result of a word search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message from 
the page (and the book) from which it is drawn.” (Authors Guild 2014, 97). Libraries engaging in 
activities to create databases of copyrighted works for nonconsumptive purposes should be 
confident. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright law aims to provide economic incentive to creators and to encourage the 
development of culture. To that end, the law sets limits on exclusive rights of copyright owners 
to allow uses that advance societal needs and spread knowledge. Fair use is among the most 
powerful legal doctrines within the set of exceptions to owner rights that allows educators and 
other members of society to reap the benefits of creative works. Fair use consists of four factors 
that courts weigh together to determine whether a disputed use is fair and thus non-infringing on 
an owner’s rights. Part of the power of fair use is that no single factor solely determines the 
outcome and it does not contain bright-line rules. The hallmark flexibility of the fair use statute 
allows courts to exercise complex interpretive analysis according to each set of facts arising from 
a given dispute.  
 
The GSU and HathiTrust cases are the first significant lawsuits to take libraries to court 
as defendants. Each case follows a different path of interpretation within fair use jurisprudence. 
Whereas the GSU courts follow case law that emphasizes the commercial and market effect 
embodied in the fourth factor, the HDL courts follow case law that focuses on the purpose and 
character of the work to determine a finding of fair use. The availability of digital licenses for the 
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excerpts weighs heavily in GSU, as does the amount used in light of the purpose. But using a 
reasonable, helpful, fair use checklist to make decisions, GSU instructors make proper 
determinations about fair use. Through two rounds at the District Court, the vast majority of the 
uses of copyrighted material made by GSU instructors for pedagogical purposes, and supported 
by the University Library electronic reserves system, are fair use. The HDL courts placed a 
higher significance on whether the use is transformative in its four-factor analysis. There, the 
court reasoned the more transformative the uses, the more they counted as fair. While the HDL 
was declared the prevailing party with a successful fair use defense, and the District Court has 
twice found GSU the prevailing party, the GSU lawsuit is still pending in the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals as of April 2018. These two cases inform and contextualize activities that 
libraries perform on a daily basis to meet their educational and research missions within the legal 
landscape. Coupled with the ARL Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research 
Libraries, they should help librarians understand and anticipate how courts apply the four-factor 
test of fair use.  
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NOTES 
1 17 U.S.C. § 110, Exemption of certain performances and displays 
 
2 17 U.S.C. § 121, Reproduction for blind or other people with disabilities 
 
3 17 U.S.C. § 109, Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord 
 
4 17 U.S.C. § 108, Reproduction by libraries and archives 
 
5 The minority opinion was a concurrence since the judge agreed with the majority that the case should be 
reversed and remanded, but reads like a dissent since it disputes the majority’s reasoning in doing so. 
 
6 Since the defendants in the GSU case were sued in their capacity, not individually, the GSU case is 
referred to as both Patton and Becker, the two presidents of GSU during the course of this litigation. 
 
7 The HathiTrust court did not consider the preservation purpose to be transformative, but still fair under 
the first factor since it was for a noncommercial use. 
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